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Preliminary mandatory injunctions in the nature of specific per-
formance, however, issue very rarely.14 Courts occasionally adopt
this form of relief for abating nuisances. 15
The case under discussion has all the prerequisites necessary for
a preliminary mandatory injunction. In view of petitioner's con-
duct, his insolvency, and the possible dissipation of part of the de-
cedent's estate, the court quite properly invoked the provisional rem-
edy to place the bonds in the custody of the court until final hearing.
At that time the petitioner may set up his claim and have his rights
adjudicated. The court wisely took that course in preference to
transferring the property to the other claimants. While the case
turns in part on a West Virginia statute16 providing for the equi-
table protection of property in a case pending, that statute only
strengthens the court's hand.
WM. CAREY PARKER.
Insurance-Incontestable Clause as Defense in Action on
Life Policy.
The plaintiff issued a life insurance policy containing a liability
exemption clause in case insured met his death while engaged in rail-
road employment. A statute provided that life insurance policies
Worth, etc., Contractors, Inc., 8 S. W. (2d) 730 (Tex Civ. App. 1928)
(revocation of plumber's license).
. In Boskowitz v. Cohn, 197 App. Div. 776, 189 N. Y. Supp. 419 (1921)
an injunction ousted sub-lessees where lessees sub-leased in violation of a
condition in their lease giving lessors right to possession without notice in
case of breach, and in Kellerman v. Chase & Co., 101 Fla. 785, 135 So. 127
(1931), the court ordered -performance of contract to deliver tomato crop, it
being highly perishable. See also American Lead Pencil Co. v. Schneegass, 178
Fed. 735 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1910) where mandatory relief was properly refused.
Where complainant acted in bad faith relief was denied in Winton Motor
Carriage Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 196 Fed. 906 (E. D. Pa. 1912) )contract for
commercial advertising in periodical). Accord: Amalgamated Furniture Fac-
tories, Inc. v. Rochester Times-Union, Inc., 128 Misc. Rep. 673, 219 N. Y.
Supp. 705 (1927).
"Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kelley, 77 N. J. Eq. 129, 75 Atl. 758 (1910) (de-
fective building a public and private nuisance which must be removed or
repaired) ; Salisbury v. Andrews, 128 Mass. 336 (1880) (light and sunshine
shut out by alley obstruction) ; Pierce v. City of New Orleans, supra note 11;
relief refused in Ort v. Bowden, 148 S. W. 1145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (base-
ball park blocking street).
-*2W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 53, art. 6, §1: "A court of equity may, in a proper
case pending therein, in which funds or property of a corporation, firm or
person is involved, and there is danger of the loss or misappropriation of the
same or a material part thereof, appoint a special receiver of such funds or
property, or of the rents, issues and profits thereof, or both, who shall give
bond with good security to be approved by the court. .. 
NOTES AND COMMENTS
should be incontestable, for any reason save nonpayment of premiums
and military service, one year from date of issue.' The insured was
killed in railroad employment more than one year after issuance, and
this suit was instituted to cancel the policy.2 Held: The defense of
incontestability was not good since the action was not a contest of
the policy (i.e., a denial of it), but an insistence upon its terms.3
On the theory that an insurance company may assume only such
risks as it sees fit,4 the decision appears both clear and reasonable
and represents the majority view in the United States.5
Incontestable clauses in life insurance policies are required in
twenty-five- states.8 By way of inducement to purchasers of insur-
ance, companies voluntarily insert similar provisions in policies sold
elsewhere.7 With few exceptions statute-prescribed clauses are uni-
form.8 They allow a two year contestable period and permit after
IVA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §4228.
2United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Massey, 164 S. E. 529 (Va.
1932). The policy was a fifteen year endowment life insurance contract
which provided that the insurer advance the sum of the policy, $5,000, to the
insured immediately. The latter agreed to pay $51.75 per month for fifteen
years should he live that long; but in case of death the obligation was to be
discharged. By way of security the insured gave a bond in the penalty of
$10,000 and a deed of trust on certain real estate.
"The incontestable clause should be construed merely as an agreement
on the part of the'insurer not to contest the validity of the policy as written."
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 281, citing Sipp v. Philadelphia Life Ins.
Co., 293 Pa. 292, 142 Ati. 221 (1928). *
"... a policy of insurance is' a voluntary contract. Nearly any kind of
agreement that is not contrary to law or public policy may be included therein.
An insurer may impose such conditions as it desires and the insured may take
them or go without the policy, as it may choose." Whitney v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 47 F. (2d) 861, 864 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
'American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 92 S. E. 706
(1917); Dibble v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 170 Cal. 199, 149 Pac. 171 (1915).
'Ala., Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Neb.,
N. H., N. J., N. M., N. Y., N. D., Okla., Ore., Pa., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Va., and
Wyo. North Carolina has no suich statute. An excellent interpretation of a
voluntarily inserted clause is to be found in American Trust Co. v. Life Ins.
Co. of Va., supra note 5.
7 "Premiums upon life policies are often paid at a great sacrifice, and one
of the most disturbing and unsatisfactory features of the insurance contract
is the fact that after the sacrifices and payments have been made for a num-
ber of years, and the insured has died, so that his testimony and perhaps that
of others has been rendered unavailable by the lapse of time and the occur-
rence of death, instead of receiving the promised reward, the beneficiary will
be met with a contest and a lawsuit to determine whether the insurance ever
had any validity or force. Hence it has 'become an almost universal practice
with insurance companies to provide against any contest or forfeiture of their
policies after a certain length of time, greater in some cases and less in
others." Clement v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Tenn. 22, 46 S. W. 561, 562(1898).
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that time the specific defenses of nonpayment of premiums and mil-
itary service.P Self-imposed incontestability clauses contain pro-
visions similar to those prescribed by statute.10 They do, however,
often provide broader defenses, and sometimes waive the period of
contestability altogether."
Interpretation of incontestability clauses, both mandatory and
voluntary, has not been uniform.12 Courts differ as to what consti-
tutes a sufficient contest of the policy, a substantial majority holding
that court action is necessary, such as instituting a suit for cancel-
lation or filing an answer to a suit brought on the policy.'8 A few
courts have held that a definite and positive repudiation of the policy
plus a tender of the premiums paid is sufficient.14 Most courts hold
that the contestable period runs its course irrespective of the in-
sured's death beforehand ;15 but they allow a suspension of the run-
ning of the period from the time of the insured's death to the ap-
pointment of his administrator, for in the interim there is no one
8 A typical example of incontestability statutes is found in Indiana: "... the
policy shall be incontestable after it shall have been in force during the life-
time of the insured for two years from its date, except for nonpayment of
premiums and except for violation of the conditions of the policy relating to
naval and military service in time of war." IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§9036 (3). The Virginia statute provides a one year period only. VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1930) §4228. Alabama sets the final date of contestability
"after two annual premium payments have been made." ALA. CODE (Michie,
1928) §8365.
9 Supra note 8.
" Hardy v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 180 N. C. 180, 104 S. E. 166
(1920).
"Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Fox, 106 Tenn. 347, 61 S. W. 62 (1901)
was a contest of a policy which provided for incontestability for any reason
other than misstatement of age, and was to take effect upon issuance. (This
case arose before the adoption of the Tennessee incontestable statute.)
"This is to be expected since all clauses do not embody the same provisions
and all courts do not maintain the same attitude toward insurance companies.
"In Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Pickering, 293 Fed. 496, 499
(C. C. A. 5th, 1923), it was said that "a contest so provided for imports
litigation, the invoking of judicial action to cancel or prevent the enforcement
of the policy, either by a suit to that end, or.by a defense.to an action on the
policy. A mere denial or repudiation by the insurer of its liability under the
policy, accompanied by a tender of the premiums paid, is not a contest, within
the meaning of the provision." Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford, 161
Ark. 602, 257 S.W. 66 (1923).
" Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rose, 294 Fed. 122 (E. D. Ky. 1923).
"Plotner v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 48 N. D. 295, 183 N. W.
1000 (1921). This case is discussed with approval in (1921) 20 Mici. L. Rsv.
111. Monahan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 283 Ill. 136, 119 N. E. 68 (1918).
This line of cases is based on the reasoning that such interpretation is in ac-
cord with the intent of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the
policies.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
against whom the insurer can bring suit.16 Some, however, take the
position that death under these circumstances stops the running of
the period.17
It is not necessarily true that an incontestability clause denies the
insurer, after the expiration of the period of contestability, all de-
fenses not specifically excepted.' 8 Courts allow the defense of lack
of insurable interest19 even after the period of contestability20 on
the ground that wager policies are contrary to public policy. 21 After
the contestable period has expired fraud is universally denied as a
defense.22 When policies are made incontestable from date of issue,
some courts allow a reasonable time in which to interpose this de-
fense.23 Others, however, construe these policies in their strictest
terms and deny relief.2 4
WILSON BARBER.
"Jensen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 336, 167 N. E. 462(1929); Ramsay v. Old Colony Life Ins. Co., 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. 108
(1921).
17 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 157 Minn. 253, 195 N. W. 913 (1923).
'This would appear so from the face of the policy. Implications of law
are not, of course, printed in the policy. Infra note 19. In Elwood v. New
England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 158 At. 257 (Pa. 1931), an exceptional de-
fense was allowed an insurer in an action on a -policy containing an incon-
testable clause. The plaintiff made an unsuccessful attempt to take his life,
but only maimed himself. His suit to collect damages was denied on the
grounds of being opposed to public policy.
"What amounts to an insurable interest is a problem of considerable diffi-
culty. See VANcE, INsURANcE (2d ed. 1930) 147-164.
* Clearly the defense would be a good one before the expiration of the
period.
1 Dakota Life Ins. Co. v. Midland Nat. Bank of Minneapolis, 18 F. (2d)
903 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Bromley's Adm. v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 122
Ky. 402, 92 S. W. 17 (1906). A case contra is cited and discussed in (1931)
19 GEo. L. J. 501, that of Bogacki v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 253
Mich. 253, 234"N. W. 865 (1931). This case cites as its authority Wright v.
Mutual Benefit Asso., 188 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186, 16 Am. St. Rep. 794(1890), but this is a doubtful precedent since the defense of lack of an in-
surable interest was not pressed, and the opinion of the court proceeded on
other grounds.
'Wright v. Mutual Benefit Asso., supra note 21. Incontestability clauses
are said to be in the nature of short statutes of limitation, and are not contrary
to public policy as condoning fraud. Drews v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79
N. J. L. 398, 75 Atl. 167 (1910); Hardy v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
supra note 10. Note (1920) 6 A. L. R. 448.
Reagan v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217 (1905).
MacKendree v. Southern States Life Ins. Co., 112 S. C. 335, 99 S. E.
806 (1919); Duvall v. Nat. Ins. Co., 28 Idaho 356, 154 Pac. 632 (1916).
Note (1920) 6 A. L. R. 448.
